Criminal Courts and Tribunals by French, Tracy et al.
Human Rights Brief
Volume 20 | Issue 2 Article 10
2013
Criminal Courts and Tribunals
Tracy French
American University Washington College of Law
Megan Wakefield
American University Washington College of Law
William Xu
American University Washington College of Law
Alli Assiter
American University Washington College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons
This Column is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Human Rights Brief by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation




Icc handS down acquIttal In 
congoleSe mIlItary caSe
The International Criminal Court 
handed down its second verdict and first 
acquittal in its ten-year history on December 
18, 2012, in the case of Mathieu Ngudjolo. 
Ngudjolo, together with Germain Katanga, 
faced charges of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity with regard to acts in the 
Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo in 2003. As of February 2013, the 
Trial Chamber had not issued a verdict on 
the charges against Katanga. In Ngudjolo’s 
case, the panel of three judges of Trial 
Chamber II found that the Prosecutor had 
presented insufficient evidence to estab-
lish beyond a reasonable doubt Ngudjolo’s 
responsibility for the attack on the village 
of Bogoro. Those who viewed Ngudjolo’s 
trial as a sign that the international com-
munity would hold accountable those 
responsible for the atrocities committed in 
the Ituri region see his acquittal as a major 
setback. The outcome has also raised ques-
tions about the Office of the Prosecutor’s 
ability to effectively collect and present 
evidence in a court so far removed from the 
crimes it tries.
The Prosecutor issued warrants for 
Ngudjolo’s and Katanga’s arrests on June 
25, 2007, and submitted the Amended 
Charging Document in June 2008. On 
September 30, 2008, Pre-Trial Chamber 
I unanimously found sufficient evidence 
to establish substantial grounds to believe 
that Ngudjolo and Katanga had commit-
ted the crimes charged by the prosecution 
and so the case progressed to be heard and 
decided by a Trial Chamber. On November 
21, 2012, Trial Chamber II severed the 
charges against Ngudjolo and Katanga, cit-
ing evidence that changed the legal charac-
terization of one of the modes of liability 
for Katanga.
The charges against Ngudjolo, a 
Congolese militia leader, allege his respon-
sibility for the attack by armed forces 
in Bogoro that resulted in the rape and 
murder of more than 200 people, includ-
ing children. Female survivors of the 
attack on Bogoro were held in camps as 
sex slaves after the attack. The Charging 
Document indicted Ngudjolo and Katanga 
under Article 25(3)(a) as principals who 
indirectly co-perpetrated war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. Article 25(3)
(a) provides that a person shall be crimi-
nally responsible and liable for punishment 
if that person “commits such a crime, 
whether as an individual, jointly with 
another or through another person, regard-
less of whether that other person is crimi-
nally responsible.” The war crimes charges 
fell under Article 8(2)(b) and comprised 
using child solders, directly attacking a 
civilian population, willful killing, destruc-
tion of property, pillaging, sexual slavery, 
and rape. The crimes against humanity 
charges fall under Article 7(1) and include 
murder, rape, and sexual slavery.
The ICC’s standard of proof in Article 
66(3) of the Rome Statute states that “in 
order to convict the accused, the Court 
must be convinced of the guilt of the 
accused beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
According to Article 66, accused persons 
are presumed innocent until proven guilty. 
In the judgment, the three-judge panel 
found that the prosecution failed this stan-
dard because the judges noted unreliable 
testimony by three crucial prosecution 
witnesses who could not definitively sup-
port that Ngudjolo was responsible for 
the attack. Despite the ruling, Presiding 
Judge Bruno Cotte added that Ngudjolo’s 
acquittal “does not necessarily mean that 
the alleged fact did not occur,” stressing 
that the ruling did not put into question the 
victims’ suffering.
Since the ICC announced its judg-
ment, many human rights groups have 
expressed grave concern over the Office of 
the Prosecutor’s effectiveness in bringing 
human rights abusers to justice. Geraldine 
Mattiolo-Zeltner, International Justice 
Advocacy Director at Human Rights 
Watch, stated that, “given the judges’ com-
ments on the insufficient evidence pro-
duced during the trial, [Chief Prosecutor 
Fatou] Bensouda should speed up efforts to 
improve investigative practices and pros-
ecutorial policy.” The need to improve 
investigations conducted by the Office 
of the Prosecutor does appear to be of 
concern to Bensouda, who was elected in 
June 2012 to the position and confirmed 
her commitment to the cause at the ICC 
Assembly of States Parties session in The 
Hague in November. Without effective 
investigation, prosecutorial practices, and 
policy, it will be impossible for the ICC to 
provide justice to victims of human rights 
abuses worldwide.
Icc aPPealS chamber confIrmS 
JurISdIctIon In caSe agaInSt 
former côte d’IVoIre PreSIdent
The ICC Appeals Chamber held on 
December 12, 2012, that the Court has 
jurisdiction to try former Côte d’Ivoire 
President Laurent Gbagbo despite the 
defense’s numerous challenges. Gbagbo 
faces charges related to events surround-
ing his failure to step down after losing the 
2010 presidential election. The Court con-
firmed charges on four counts of crimes 
against humanity including murder, rape 
and other sexual violence, persecution, 
and other inhuman acts committed during 
the post-election violence in Côte d’Ivoire 
between December 16, 2010, and April 12, 
2011. The confirmation of jurisdiction in this 
case strengthens the Court’s ability to exer-
cise jurisdiction in order to hold international 
human rights violators accountable.
Gbagbo served as president from his 
election in 2000 until his defeat by current 
President Alassane Ouattara in the long 
overdue elections of November 28, 2010. 
Gbagbo refused to accept defeat, leading 
to protracted violence throughout Côte 
d’Ivoire until April 2011, when President 
Ouattara finally took power with the help 
of French and United Nations forces. The 
violence by both sides led to 3,000 deaths 
and nearly one million displaced civilians. 
The ICC Prosecutor requested authoriza-
tion from the Pre-Trial Chamber to initiate 
his own investigation into the situation in 
Côte d’Ivoire in June 2011. The Chamber 
granted his proprio motu investigation 
request in October 2011, and the Court 
issued the warrant for Gbagbo’s arrest 
on November 23, 2011. Gbagbo is being 
charged individually as an indirect co-
perpetrator of the attacks against civilian 
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Ouattara supporters that the prosecution 
argues were committed by forces acting on 
his behalf. After his arrest in April 2011, 
Gbagbo was held under house arrest in 
Côte d’Ivoire until his extradition to The 
Hague in November 2011.
The Pre-Trial Chamber categorically 
rejected all challenges to the Court’s juris-
diction, despite the fact that Côte d’Ivoire 
is not a formal State Party to the Rome 
Statute. The Chamber based its jurisdiction 
on a declaration made by Côte d’Ivoire in 
2003 that recognized the Court’s jurisdic-
tion for actions that occurred from 2002 
to 2003 pursuant to Article 12(3) of the 
Rome Statute.
On August 21, 2012, Gbagbo appealed 
the decision to the Appeals Chamber 
on ten different grounds. The first two 
grounds dealt with the appropriateness 
of Côte d’Ivoire’s participation as a non-
State Party in the Pre-trial Chamber’s 
review of the jurisdictional challenge. The 
Appeals Chamber found that the Pre-
Trial Chamber had erred in not issuing a 
separate decision on the request for leave 
to file submissions, thereby not allow-
ing Gbagbo or the Prosecutor to respond 
to Côte d’Ivoire’s submissions. However, 
Gbagbo failed to demonstrate how that 
error materially affected the decision and 
the Chamber therefore rejected the first two 
grounds of appeal.
Grounds three through five related to 
the interpretation of Article 12(3) and the 
declarations made by Côte d’Ivoire in rela-
tion to Article 12(3). On April 18, 2003, 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Côte 
d’Ivoire submitted a declaration to the 
Court accepting the Court’s jurisdiction 
pursuant to Article 12(3) “for the purposes 
of identifying, investigating and trying 
the perpetrators and accomplices of acts 
committed on Ivorian territory since [the] 
events of 19 September 2002.” Gbagbo 
challenged the scope of this declaration, 
arguing that it only gave the Court jurisdic-
tion over events that occurred before the dec-
laration was made. The Appeals Chamber, 
looking to the text and purpose of Article 12, 
found that there was no temporal limit on the 
jurisdiction submitted to by the 2003 declara-
tion, and that the wording suggested explicit 
consent to jurisdiction with respect to crimes 
committed after the declaration.
Grounds six through ten of Gbagbo’s 
appeal claimed the Pre-Trial Chamber 
had erred in addressing his argument that 
his fundamental rights had been violated 
to the extent that the Court should not 
exercise its jurisdiction over him. These 
claims were based on alleged violations of 
Gbagbo’s fundamental rights from his arrest 
by domestic authorities on April 11, 2011, 
until his transfer to The Hague on November 
29, 2011. The Appeals Chamber quickly 
denied these five grounds within the mean-
ing of Article 82(1)(a) of the Rome Statute 
as not referring to a decision with respect 
to jurisdiction. Article 82(1)(a) gives either 
party the ability to appeal a decision with 
respect to jurisdiction or admissibility.
The significance of the Appeals 
Chamber confirmation of jurisdiction in 
this case cannot be overstated given that 
Côte d’Ivoire is not a Member State and 
that the Prosecutor initiated the investiga-
tion proprio motu. Of the eight situations 
the Court has investigated, the Prosecutor 
initiated two, Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire. In 
four of the eight situations, the State Party 
initiated the investigation. The United 
Nations Security Council initiated the two 
remaining situations in Darfur and Libya. 
Proprio motu investigations give the Court 
the ability to act independent from global 
politics to hold states accountable. While 
state sovereignty is a recognized and cen-
tral right in modern world politics, the 
ICC’s independence and corresponding 
ability to effectively prosecute impunity 
and enforce accountability requires that it 
be able to exercise jurisdiction in a broad 
array of circumstances. Despite limited 
state consent and non-party status of the 
state in question, a confirmation of the 
Prosecutor’s ability to initiate investiga-
tions may have broad ramifications for the 
potential scope of future investigations.
Tracy French, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 




wIth end In SIght for rwandan 
InternatIonal crImInal trIbunal, 
queStIonS of JurISdIctIon, 
Procedure, and PublIc PercePtIon 
remaIn
The International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR, the Tribunal) convicted 
Augustin Ngirabatware, a former govern-
ment minister, of genocide, incitement 
to commit genocide, and extermination 
and rape as crimes against humanity on 
December 20, 2012. Ngirabatware was 
sentenced to 35 years in prison for his role 
in orchestrating the Rwandan genocide 
as Planning Minister in the Hutu govern-
ment. Ngirabatware was the last person 
facing trial before the Tribunal, and when 
the final cases on appeal are resolved, the 
ICTR will close. The Tribunal has stated 
that it must close by December 2014, 
when all further cases will be transferred 
to local courts in Kigali. Since its creation 
in 1994, the ICTR has resolved 71 cases, 
resulting in 92 indictments, ten acquittals, 
and 32 convicted Rwandans who are cur-
rently serving prison sentences in Mali and 
Benin. The ICTR will attempt to complete 
the seven outstanding appeals involving 
seventeen individuals before its closure 
next year. The first appellate decision — 
an acquittal in the cases of Justin Mugenzi 
and Prosper Mugiraneza — was handed 
down on February 4, 2013, and ICTR 
President Judge Vagn Joensen predicted 
that seven convicted persons will receive 
appellate decisions during 2013, with the 
remaining ten appeals to be decided in 
2014. The United Nations has also stepped 
up its search for nine alleged perpetrators of 
the Rwandan genocide who remain at large.
The ICTR determined that local courts 
have demonstrated their ability to fairly try 
Jean Uwinkindi, the first indictee trans-
ferred to Kigali, justifying the transfer of 
the remaining indictments for trial in local 
courts. However, Uwinkindi’s case has 
been stayed since his counsel challenged 
the constitutionality of the transfer. As this 
case is resolved, public opinion throughout 
the international community will have 
to act as a check on fair and humane 
treatment of indictees by monitoring how 
individuals are treated when they return 
to their home country. Eight individuals 
convicted by the ICTR, including those 
who have been acquitted or who have 
completed their sentences, have already 
stated that they do not want to return to 
Rwanda, but no other state has agreed to 
accept them.
Despite the availability of local courts, 
the ICTR has determined that if any of the 
three most wanted indictees are captured, 
they will be tried using a special interna-
tional legal structure, the Mechanism for 
International Criminal Tribunals (MICT).
One such indictee, Ngirabatware’s father-
in-law, Felicien Kabuga, is still at large 
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and wanted by the international commu-
nity for genocide, crimes against human-
ity, and serious violations of international 
humanitarian law. Kabuga is a millionaire 
accused of funding the 1994 genocide 
that killed one million Tutsi people. He 
has a $5 million bounty on his head, put 
up by the United States. Kabuga is still in 
hiding, allegedly in Kenya, according to 
ICTR prosecutor Hassan Bubacar Jallow. 
The two other most wanted indictees are 
Protais Mpiranyi, former Commander 
of the Rwandan Presidential Guard, and 
Augustin Bizimana, former Minister of 
Defense. While the end of its mandate 
is in sight, the ICTR stated last month 
that it will not relent in its search for the 
remaining indictees, and has expanded its 
search to other African countries outside of 
Kenya. As the UN increases its resources 
to apprehend the three most wanted indict-
ees from Rwanda, there is a danger that 
public perception of their guilt necessarily 
follows, decreasing the chances for the 
indictees, assuming they are apprehended, 
to receive a fair trial either at the local or 
international level.
The MICT, established by the UN 
Security Council on December 22, 2010, 
will assume the remaining functions of 
the ICTR as it completes its mandate. It 
will manage the archives from the ICTR’s 
tenure, continue to protect witnesses and 
victims, and hear all appeals filed after 
June 2012, including a potential appeal by 
the recently convicted Ngirabatware.
In the pursuit of justice, the public’s 
perception of trials within Rwanda remains 
of chief importance. International criminal 
tribunals in general suffer a fair amount of 
criticism regarding whether justice is truly 
served by prosecuting individuals outside 
of the country in which war crimes were 
committed. Critics have also raised the 
question of whether prosecutions executed 
in an international tribunal promote or 
contravene efforts of transitional justice. 
As the ICTR closes and the execution of 
justice is transferred to yet another external 
tribunal, Rwandan citizens and the interna-
tional community will be watching closely 
to ensure that each indictee receives a fair 
trial, that the State of Rwanda eventually 
gains control over its process of transi-
tional justice, and that justice is served.
acquIttalS for croatIan generalS 
raISe queStIonS about the Icty 
and ItS legacy
The International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY, the Tribunal) 
raised worldwide questions about the legit-
imacy of internationalized criminal justice 
and the impartiality of the tribunal with 
its recent acquittals of Croatian Generals 
Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markac. The 
generals were sentenced to 24 and eigh-
teen years, respectively, for committing 
crimes of murder and inhumane acts 
against Croatian Serbs during the war in 
Yugoslavia. Both men were sentenced for 
crimes that Croatian troops allegedly com-
mitted during Operation Storm, a large-
scale operation that began on August 4, 
1995, and resulted in the defeat of the 
Republic of the Serbian Krajina, a self-
determined Serbian state.
Gotovina was a colonel general in the 
Croatian Army and commanded Operation 
Storm. Markac was the Assistant Minister 
of the Interior and commanded the special 
police in Croatia in 1995. In Gotovina’s 
trial, the prosecution alleged that his shell-
ing offensive killed 324 Serb civilians 
and soldiers, and displaced almost 90,000 
Serbs from a contested territory. Gotovina 
and Markac appealed their convictions, 
arguing that they did not intend to target 
civilians. Judges overturned the ruling the 
following year, with the majority granting 
acquittal, due to a lack of evidence that 
the generals intended to target civilians, 
based on a totality of the circumstances. 
Gotovina and Markac returned to Croatia 
to a hero’s welcome, where they were met 
in Zagreb’s main square by tens of thou-
sands of people singing nationalist songs 
and waving flags.
The Appeals Chamber rendered the 
acquittals when, upon review of the trial 
court’s decision, it found a number of 
mistakes in the verdicts. ICTY Chief 
Prosecutor Serge Brammertz pointed out 
that the acquittals were issued after the 
appeals judges “assess[ed] the evidence on 
the record in its totality and [gave] appro-
priate deference to a trial chamber’s factual 
findings.” Many critics of the Gotovina 
and Markac acquittals cite the dissent-
ing opinions of Judges Fausto Pocar and 
Carmel Agius. These dissents, however, do 
not have widespread legal traction because 
of their harsh tone and misapplication of 
the legal standard applied in support of the 
conviction of engaging in a joint criminal 
enterprise.
In December 2012, university stu-
dents, joined by Minister of Justice Nikola 
Selakovic, crowded around the Serbian 
Parliament to protest the recent acquittals 
of the Croatian Generals, asking for an 
extraordinary parliament session to adopt 
a resolution ensuring fair conclusions for 
the remaining cases before the Tribunal. 
In a June 2012 debate at the UN Security 
Council, members maintained an East-
West split on opinions about ICTY rul-
ings. While the United States, Germany, 
and Great Britain wished to respect the 
verdicts acquitting Gotovina and Markac, 
Russia asserted that the decisions were 
unfair, and China reiterated the impor-
tance of maintaining impartiality in inter-
nationalized judicial proceedings. At the 
Security Council hearing, Serbian First 
Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic 
condemned the acquittals, pointing out that 
no Croatian indictees have been convicted 
for war crimes committed against the 
Serbs, nor has any top Croatian or Bosnian 
official been charged, despite common 
belief that all parties committed crimes 
during the conflict beginning on June 25, 
1991, throughout the former Yugoslavia.
Croatian Ambassador to the United 
Nations Ranko Vilovic, however, stated 
that although Croatians may be frus-
trated that individuals who committed war 
crimes are not being held to the same 
account as the criminal organization of the 
Croatian authorities, they are not justified 
in questioning the validity of the verdicts. 
Many Serbs do not feel the ICTY is serv-
ing justice, and this feeling may increase 
the divisive ethnic divide between the 
Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks, and inten-
sify feelings of victimization, vindica-
tion, and persecution. Brammertz claimed 
that those affected by Operation Storm 
feel that the international community has 
not recognized their suffering. According 
to Brammertz, because justice is being 
served one-sidedly, this process, which 
should be characterized by transition and 
healing, will more likely serve as ammuni-
tion for future conflicts.
When the ICTY’s mandate ends in 
the coming year, its legacy will leave the 
international community with a number 
of difficult questions: What has been the 
purpose of the ICTY? Whose justice has 
it served? Can internationalized criminal 
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tribunals truly contribute to the transi-
tional justice process? How will the les-
sons learned from this tribunal inform 
future tribunals or alternative methods of 
post-conflict criminal justice? In Syria, 
although protracted conflict is ongoing, 
civil society groups and the international 
community are already discussing the mer-
its and methods of a Syrian ad hoc tribunal. 
A tribunal, whether administered through 
the Arab League or through the United 
Nations, like the ICTY, would raise the 
same questions for Syria and other nations 
facing future periods of transitional justice, 
including jurisdiction for international 
criminal prosecution.
Megan Wakefield, a J.D. candidate 
at the American University Washington 
College of Law, is a staff writer for the 
Human Rights Brief.
Judgment SummarIeS: 
InternatIonal crImInal  
trIbunal for rwanda
the ProSecutor V. IldePhonSe 
hategekImana, aPPealS Judgment, 
caSe no. Ictr-00-55-a
On May 8, 2012, the Appeals Chamber 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) issued its judgment in the 
case against Ildephonse Hategekimana, 
dismissing each of the Defense’s seven 
grounds of appeal. Hategekimana, a lieu-
tenant in the Rwandan army who com-
manded soldiers at the Ngoma Military 
Camp in the Butare Prefecture during 
the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, was ini-
tially convicted on December 6, 2010, 
on several counts of genocide and crimes 
against humanity and sentenced to life 
imprisonment. The Appeals Chamber 
affirmed each of his convictions and his 
term of imprisonment.
Hategekimana’s first ground for 
appeal alleged that the Trial Chamber 
violated his right to a fair trial. This 
challenge involved a number of claims, 
including a charge that his presump-
tion of innocence was violated when the 
Tribunal chose to display, in the building 
where Hategekimana was being tried, a 
drawing by a twelve-year-old who was 
one of the winners of an “Essays and 
Drawings” contest held by the ICTR. 
This particular drawing depicted a judge 
pointing his finger at a defendant and 
saying the words: “You Hategekimana… 
tell what you have done in genocide. 
You, Hategekimana you will go in prison 
30 years.” The defendant in the picture 
is saying: “I have killed 77 people.” 
Hategekimana argued that displaying 
this picture in the corridor outside his 
trial room may have influenced the Trial 
Chamber judges. He also pointed out that 
one of the Legal Officers that contributed 
to drafting the judgment against him was 
on the jury that judged the “Essays and 
Drawings” competition. In response, the 
Appeals Chamber held that, although 
it was “highly improper” to display 
the drawing, Hategekimana failed to 
establish that the drawing would itself 
be sufficient to create an appearance of 
bias in the mind of a reasonable observer 
who had been properly informed of the 
circumstances. In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Appeals Chamber gave particular 
weight to the fact that when Hategekimana 
complained about the picture prior 
to the public reading of the judgment 
against him, the Trial Chamber imme-
diately ordered the drawing removed. 
The Appeals Chamber also rejected 
Hategekimana’s claim with regard to 
the Legal Officer, noting that the charge 
was “based on the erroneous premise 
that legal officers play a controlling 
role in judicial decision-making.” The 
Appeals Chamber similarly dismissed the 
accused’s other claims that his fair trial 
rights were violated, including allegations 
that the Trial Chamber breached his right 
to be tried in his presence when it permit-
ted Hategekimana’s Defense counsel to 
deliver closing arguments in the absence 
of his client after Hategekimana refused 
to appear in court, and that the Chamber 
“assumed the role of Prosecutor or wit-
ness” by posing questions to witnesses 
from the bench.
In addition to challenging his convic-
tion on grounds relating to alleged viola-
tions of his fair trial rights, Hategekimana 
sought to overturn a number of the Trial 
Chamber’s findings on the ground that 
the Chamber inappropriately evaluated 
the evidence against him. In particular, 
Hategekimana challenged the fact that 
the Trial Chamber relied on hearsay and 
circumstantial evidence to convict him 
on several counts. The Appeals Chamber 
dismissed these claims, and stated that “… 
as a matter of law, it is permissible to base 
a conviction on circumstantial or hearsay 
evidence,” and determined that the lower 
court had exercised sufficient caution 
in reviewing the relevant evidence to 
produce a conviction. The Appeals 
Chamber also dismissed several attempts 
by the Defense to discredit witness tes-
timony concerning the involvement of 
Hategekimana and his men in the alleged 
crimes, such as claims that questioned the 
witnesses’ ability to distinguish between 
Hategekimana’s soldiers and militant 
groups such as the Interahamwe, and 
witness testimony regarding the defen-
dant’s presence at the scene of the crimes. 
In rejecting these grounds of appeal, the 
Appeals Chamber cited to the significant 
deference allotted to the Trial Chamber 
as the trier of fact to determine the reli-
ability of and appropriate weight to be 
given to witness testimony.
Hategekimana’s final ground of 
appeal related to his life sentence, which 
he claimed was inappropriate because the 
Trial Chamber erroneously assessed the 
gravity of his crimes and the aggravat-
ing circumstances, while disregarding a 
number of mitigating circumstances put 
forward by the Defense. The Appeals 
Chamber began by disagreeing that the 
lower court incorrectly assessed the grav-
ity of Hategekimana’s crimes, finding 
that the Trial Chamber aptly compared 
his crimes to those of other accused 
appearing before the Tribunal in the past, 
while also taking note of the “inher-
ent limitations” of comparing cases and 
“specifically assess[ing] the individual 
nature” of Hategekimana’s case. With 
regard to aggravating factors, the Appeals 
Chamber agreed with the accused that the 
Trial Chamber inappropriately character-
ized Hategekimana as being “in charge 
of peace and security” in the Ngoma 
region and erred in concluding that he 
was on the Prefecture Security Council, 
both of which were factors found to 
aggravate his crimes. However, given the 
presence of other aggravating factors and 
the gravity of the accused’s crimes, the 
Appeals Chamber did not feel that these 
errors had any impact on the “overall 
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assessment” of Hategekimana’s sentence. 
Finally, the Appeals Chamber determined 
that the Defense failed to demonstrate 
any “discernable error” with regard to the 
Trial Chamber’s assessment of mitigating 
circumstances.
William Xu, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, wrote this summary for the 
Human Rights Brief. Katherine Cleary 
Thompson, Assistant Director of the 
War Crimes Research Office, edited this 
summary for the Human Rights Brief.
the ProSecutor V. karemera 
and ngIrumPatSe, caSe no. 
Ictr-98-44-t
On February 2, 2012, Trial Chamber 
III of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR) issued its judgment 
in the case against Edouard Karemera and 
Matthieu Ngirumpatse, often referred to 
as the “Government I” case. The accused 
were convicted of direct and public 
incitement to commit genocide, geno-
cide, the crimes against humanity of rape 
and extermination, and serious violations 
of Article 3 Common to the Geneva 
Conventions and of Additional Protocol 
II. The Chamber also found both accused 
guilty of conspiracy to commit genocide 
but did not enter a conviction for that 
count, finding it would be cumulative to 
convict for that charge as well as geno-
cide. Karemera and Ngirumpatse were 
both sentenced to life in prison. Initially, 
the case included two additional accused, 
Joseph Nzirorera and André Rwamakuba. 
However, proceedings against Nzirorera 
were terminated because of his death and 
the charges against Rwamakuba were 
severed into a separate case.
Both Karemera and Ngirumpatse 
played critical roles in the Mouvement 
Révolutionaire National pour le 
Développement (MRND), the ruling 
party of Rwanda from 1975 to 1994, 
and the Interim Government of Rwanda. 
Specifically, Karemera served as both 
the National Secretary and the First Vice 
President of the MRND and was a mem-
ber of the party’s Executive Bureau. 
Following the assassination of President 
Habyarimana, he became the Minister of 
the Interior and Communal Development 
for the Interim Government. Ngirumpatse 
also served at one point as the National 
Secretary of the MRND, as well as the 
National Party Chairman and Chairman 
of the MRND Executive Bureau. In 
addition, the Chamber determined that 
Ngirumpatse supported the creation 
of the youth wing of the MRND, the 
Interahamwe, and was the individual 
in Rwanda with the most de facto 
power, influence, and authority over the 
Interahamwe during the genocide.
One notable aspect of this judg-
ment is that the Trial Chamber found 
Karemera and Ngirumpatse guilty of 
genocide and the crime against human-
ity of rape based on acts of rape and 
other sexual assaults committed by mem-
bers of the Interahamwe, employing the 
joint criminal enterprise (JCE) theory 
of liability. The Prosecution had pleaded 
these acts under two different theories 
of JCE liability, the “basic” form of JCE 
and the “extended” form. Under both 
theories, the Prosecution must prove: (i) 
a plurality of persons, (ii) the existence 
of a common purpose that amounts to 
or involves the commission of a crime 
under the Tribunal’s statute, and (iii) a 
contribution on the part of the accused 
to the execution of the common criminal 
purpose. The theories differ in terms of 
the required mens rea. For the basic form 
of JCE, the Prosecution must establish 
that each member of the JCE acted 
with intent to commit the charged crime. 
Under the extended form of JCE, by con-
trast, the Prosecution must only establish 
that it was natural and foreseeable that 
the charged crime would be committed 
in the course of pursuing the enterprise’s 
common purpose and that the accused 
willingly assumed the risk that the crime 
would be committed. In the present case, 
the Trial Chamber determined that the 
accused participated in a JCE, the com-
mon purpose of which was the destruction 
of the Tutsi population in Rwanda, and 
that each accused contributed to the exe-
cution of the common plan. Furthermore, 
while the Chamber found insufficient 
evidence that the accused intended for 
acts of rape and sexual violence to occur 
as part of the common plan, it con-
cluded that during a genocidal campaign, 
a natural and foreseeable consequence of 
that campaign will be that soldiers and 
militias who participate in the destruc-
tion of the targeted group will resort to 
rapes and sexual assaults unless restricted 
by their superiors. Thus, the rape and 
sexual assault of Tutsi women and girls 
by soldiers, gendarmes, and militiamen, 
including the MRND Interahamwe, was 
a natural and foreseeable consequence 
of the JCE to destroy the Tutsis. The 
Chamber was thus convinced beyond 
a reasonable doubt that Karemera and 
Ngirumpatse were aware that widespread 
rapes and sexual assaults on Tutsi women 
were foreseeable consequences of the 
JCE to pursue the destruction of the 
Tutsi population in Rwanda. Finally, they 
willingly took the risk that Tutsi women 
and girls would be raped and sexually 
assaulted, as evidenced by the fact that 
they continued to participate in the JCE 
despite the widespread occurrence of 
rapes and sexual assaults on Tutsi women 
and girls.
Another interesting aspect of the 
Chamber’s judgment is its findings 
regarding the crime of direct and public 
incitement to genocide. As the ICTR 
has held in prior cases, a person may be 
guilty of direct and public incitement 
to genocide regardless of whether the 
incitement leads to the commission of 
any genocidal acts; it is sufficient that 
the audience understood the incitement 
as a call to genocide and the accused 
acted with the requisite intent. Here, the 
Chamber determined that acts amounting 
to direct and public incitement to geno-
cide were carried out in furtherance of 
the JCE to which the accused belonged 
on two separate occasions. First, it cited a 
meeting that took place on May 3, 1994, 
at the Kibuye prefectural office, which 
was attended by several high-ranking 
members of the Interim Government, 
including Prime Minister Kambanda and 
the two accused, and which was broad-
cast over the radio. At the meeting, which 
took place shortly after a massacre of 
more than 2,000 Tutsis in Kibuye, both 
Kambanda and Karemera praised the 
work of the Interahamwe and called 
for the population to continue fight-
ing the enemy. The Chamber determined 
that, through their speeches and due 
to their failure to condemn the recent 
massacre of Tutsis, Karemera and oth-
ers intended to incite the population to 
continue killing Tutsis for the purpose 
of destroying the ethnic group. Thus, the 
accused both committed direct and public 
incitement to genocide at the meeting: 
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Karemera directly in his role as speaker 
and Ngirumpatse under a theory of JCE 
liability. The second occasion cited by the 
Chamber was a May 16, 1994, meeting, 
which was also held in Kibuye and also 
broadcast over the radio. At this meeting, 
Interim President Sindikubwabo thanked 
the army and the people of Kibuye for 
“restoring” peace, despite the recent mas-
sacre of Tutsis described directly above. 
Given the context of the recent massacre, 
the Chamber again found that the speech 
was understood by the audience as a 
call to genocide and, because President 
Sindikubwabo was a member of the JCE 
to which the accused belonged, both 
Karemera and Ngirumpatse were con-
victed of direct and public incitement to 
genocide based on JCE liability on the 
basis of the speech delivered at the May 
16 meeting.
Finally, in determining that the accused 
should be sentenced to life imprison-
ment, the Chamber cited the gravity of 
the accused’s crimes, their positions of 
authority in the Interim Government, and 
the fact that there were no mitigating cir-
cumstances significant enough to justify 
mitigation of the sentence.
Alli Assiter, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, wrote this judgment summary for 
the Human Rights Brief. Chante Lasco, 
Jurisprudence Collections Coordinator 
at the War Crimes Research Office, and 
Katherine Clearly Thompson, Assistant 
Director of the War Crimes Research 
Office, edited this summary for the 
Human Rights Brief.
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